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A Global Corporate Census: Publicly-Traded and Close Companies in 1910 
By Leslie Hannah 
London School of Economics. 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
In 1910 the world had approaching a half-million corporations, only one-hundredth of today’s total. 
About one-fifth, and over half of corporate capital, was publicly-tradable, higher portions than 
today. Most publicly-quoted corporations traded in Europe and the British Empire, but most close 
(private) corporations operated in the US, which, until the 1940s, had more corporations per capita 
than anywhere else. The 83 countries surveyed differed markedly in company numbers, corporate 
capital/GDP ratios and average corporate size. Enclave economies - dominated by quoted (and often 
foreign-owned) companies - had the largest average sizes, while other nations had more varied 
mixes of large quoted corporations and close company SMEs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We are grateful for comments on earlier versions to James Foreman-Peck, Chris Kobrak, Lyndon 
Moore, Viv Nelles, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Janette Rutterford, participants in seminars in Antwerp, 
Cambridge, Hong Kong, Paris, Seoul, Tokyo, Hitotsubashi and Yale and three anonymous referees. 
The plural authorial “we” honours the many national scholars who have advised on individual 
countries and are thanked in the online statistical appendix but errors are (singularly) mine alone. 
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A Global Corporate Census: Publicly-Traded and Close Companies in 1910. 
 
                            There are now around fifty million extant corporations worldwide.1 In evaluating 
nations’ business climates, the World Bank reports their numbers and the ease and speed with 
which new companies can register.2 Those not traded on stock exchanges account for around two-
thirds of their capital or output.3 They are overwhelmingly “private limited companies,” to use the 
term current in the UK, dozens of its ex-colonies and other independent nations, conveying roughly 
the same meaning as “close corporations” in American (or Dutch) parlance.4 A large minority have 
one owner and no employees.5 At the other end of the scale, the World Federation of Stock 
Exchanges reports that in 2012 only 46,396 companies were listed on its 58 stock exchanges,6 so, 
even allowing for other exchanges and OTC markets, those whose shares are freely traded may 
constitute less than 0.2% of extant corporations. Others are subsidiaries (some giant quoted 
corporations have over one thousand subsidiaries each), private companies, or rely on off-exchange 
equity financing by business “angels,” private equity, mezzanine financiers, trusts, venture 
capitalists, rich families and other insider groups. Their shares less frequently and transparently 
change hands, with or without the formal restrictions on share transfers that many close 
corporations impose.  
                                                          
1
 authors’ estimate from websites listed at www.commercial-register.sg.ch/home/worldwide.html and 
elsewhere. 
2
 www.worldbank.org. For a critical evaluation see Fauvarque-Cosson and Kerhuel, “Law.” 
3
 Brav, “Access,” p. 264; Mayer, Firm, p. 14. 
4
 From 1907 private companies in the UK were limited to 50 shareholders, could not solicit funds from the 
public and were not required to publish balance sheets; GmbHs in Germany and Austria had similar 
characteristics, without the numbers cap. American “close corporations” (unlike the Dutch “besloten 
vennootschap”) were not legally-defined and historically sometimes described US publicly-traded companies 
with large insider family holdings, not qualifying as private companies elsewhere. From 1934 the SEC 
distinguished US firms with less than 500 shareholders for regulatory purposes. 
5
 Hipple, “Self-Employment.” 
6
 www.world-exchanges.com 
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                      Historical studies of national corporate developments have proliferated,7  but they lack a 
common framework and even those with a clearer focus, like stock exchange analyses around Rajan 
and Zingales’ “Great Reversals” or La Porta et al’s “Law and Finance” hypotheses, disagree on 
historical size estimates.8  Some researchers have preferred Goldsmith’s statistics, his stated goal 
being to include unquoted as well as quoted companies, though sometimes he included only a sub-
set of the latter.9 His pioneering numbers are patently unsuited to international comparisons, yet 
historians and economists - ignoring his own punctilious warnings - have found his numbers 
irresistible.10 Reported associations between such unstandardized historical indicators of corporate 
development and economic growth may not be entirely spurious, but they certainly require re-
examination, not least in view of economists’ recent modifications of earlier confident 
generalisations about the finance-growth nexus.11 Basic financial innovations plainly support growth, 
but more sceptical evaluations of financial excess may be in order. 
                  Economic historians thus need to develop more reliable, consistently-defined and finer-
grained data sets. This essay proposes a globally appropriate framing, which might be more broadly 
applied. It covers 83 countries in 1910: decades after many of them allowed incorporation by simple 
registration, but before corporations became as ubiquitous as they are today. The first reliable 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) report on the numbers and capital of all extant US corporations - for 
                                                          
7
 Halbeisen et al, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Schweiz, p. 332; Gianetti and Vasta, eds, Evolution of Italian 
Enterprises, p. 271: Statistics Bureau, ed., Historical Statistics of Japan, pp. 24-99; Owen, Corporation under 
Russian Law; Wright, Corporation Nation; Shannon, “Limited Companies;” Rungta, Corporations in India; Goo, 
Incorporation in Hong Kong; Neves, “Development;” Pepelasis and Emmanoulidi, “Joint-Stock Company 
Births;” Johnson, Making: Jobert, Entreprises; Davis and North, Institutional Change; North, Wallis and 
Weingast, Violence. 
8
 Rajan and Zingales. “Great;” La Porta et al, “Economic Consequences;” Musacchio, “Law;” Moore, “World;” 
Dimson et al, Triumph and Global Investment. 
9
 Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets; see online appendix 1 for inconsistencies. Rajan and 
Zingales’ figures have also been criticised (Sylla, “Schumpeter Redux”), but, with notable exceptions (Cuba, 
Chile, India and the UK, see online appendix 2), they are more consistent than Goldsmith’s. 
10
 Levine, “Finance and growth,” pp. 889-90; Forsyth and Verdier, Origins; Rousseau and Wachtel, “Financial 
Intermediation,” p. 660; Sylla, “Wall Street,” pp. 168-72.  
11
 Acemoglu and Johnson, “Unbundling Institutions;” Cecchetti and Kharroubi. “Re-assessing.” 
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the financial year beginning July 1910 - determined the target date for this census worldwide.12 We 
use definitions as near as feasible to this US source.  An earlier global census would be more 
speculative,13 while by 1910 we have sufficient data to pinpoint reasons for contradictory 
assessments. We estimate that there were only approaching a half-million corporations at that time, 
less than one per cent of today’s numbers.14 The striking feature of their later multiplication was the 
sustained growth in both numbers and aggregate values of close (private) corporations, except in 
nations enduring communist or nazi dictatorship.15 The trend away from publicly-listed companies - 
occasionally flagged by contemporaries 16 and more recent commentators17 - has received little 
historical attention, but we attempt to parse its origins. 
                          The following section defines the corporate forms included, reporting their 
geographical spread in 1910. The next details aggregate share values for most of the surveyed 
companies, which the third apportions between private and publicly-quoted; the fourth discusses 
average corporate sizes. The conclusion briefly reviews post-1910 developments and possible links 
between corporatization and growth, whose investigation these new descriptive statistics are 
intended to facilitate. 
                                                                                              I 
                         By 1910, all rich (and many developing) nations offered a general registration process 
for joint stock limited liability companies, with varying degrees of cheapness and administrative 
                                                          
12
 Commissioner, Annual Report 1911; returns for the prior financial year were incomplete.  
13
 Hannah, “Corporations.”  
14
 We enumerate 458,956 corporations in 83 countries, with countries accounting for 6% or so of the world’s 
population omitted and likely undercounting of private companies and double counting of multinational ones. 
In 1909-13 the annual growth (net of disappearances) in the numbers of corporations averaged 5% in France 
and the US, 7% in the UK, 8% in Japan and 10% in Germany. The half-million figure had probably not been 
reached by 1910, but soon was. 
15
 The elimination of Russia’s capitalist corporations, intensifying after Lenin’s NEP, was emulated by later 
communist regimes. The substantial reduction in corporations in Hitler’s Germany was less remarked upon and 
not replicated in Italy or Japan. 
16
 Jordan, Private companies; (Balfour) Committee, Factors, pp. 125-6; Fuller, “Incorporated Individual.” 
17
 Economist, 19 May 2012, pp.12, 24; Jensen, “Eclipse;” Harris, et al, “Private Equity;” Wells, “Rise.” The 
“modernity” of the private company is not universally recognised (Hannah, “Strategic Games.”) 
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simplicity, avoiding arduous, costly and sometimes monopoly-enhancing recourse to the legislature 
or executive branch.18 Joint-stock companies had often been formed (with or without government 
authority) even before such enabling legislation, but had been made simpler, cheaper, less risky and 
legally unambiguous by general incorporation laws. At the Paris World Fair of 1889 the international 
congress of corporate lawyers passed a resolution affirming the desirability of such statutory 
templates without a single dissenting voice.19 Yet Norway had no corporate statute law until 1910, 
though Norwegians could (and prolifically did) form companies by private contract.20  
                     Other nations maintained restrictive government controls: legislators cautious of 
encouraging speculation, default or disruptive competition shared with existing corporate 
incumbents a desire to maintain entry restrictions to what was still considered a privilege not a right. 
The “Young Turks’” Ottoman Law of Associations was promulgated only in 1909, Siam’s general law 
in 1911, Greece’s in 1920. The Qing imperial edict of 1904, granting general incorporation in China, 
was a bigger step in principle than in practice:  patronage of the powerful remained essential for 
many companies.21  Elsewhere bureaucrats also tried to “pick winners,” in the manner of 
seventeenth century English kings or early nineteenth century American legislators. In Russia 
corporations still required the Tsar’s authorization until his abdication in 1917, when the new (pre-
Bolshevik) government rapidly introduced liberal corporate registration. In Korea and Taiwan the 
Japanese initially limited native incorporations, until Japan’s own liberal system of 1899 was 
extended to its colonies, in 1920 and 1923 respectively.          
                 These processes generated statistical reports, but the decision in 1920 of the government-
backed proto-OECD - the Institut International de Statistique - to abandon its corporate statistics 
programme, complaining of the lack of international standardization and missing data, hints at 
                                                          
18
 Greenwood (Foreign) for a practitioner’s perspective; Bowstead’s (Commercial Laws) 24 volumes reproduce 
the corporate laws of many countries surveyed here. 
19
 Ministère, Compte-rendu, pp. 45-6. 
20
 Ostergaard and Smith, “Corporate Governance.” 
21
 Williams, Recent; Yu, “Rethinking;” Zelin, “Chinese.” 
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problems we encountered.22  Corporate demographers lack the clarity of human death: there is 
some ambiguity, particularly at the smaller end, about whether a stillborn or failing corporation 
exists in any meaningful sense. The taxman had an annual trigger (in non-payment) impelling 
verification, though the initial margin of doubt in the US was as much as 10% of corporate numbers. 
Many countries’ tax authorities, registration offices or government statisticians published data on 
the number and paid-up capital of corporations, not always agreeing. The UK tax data, for example, 
only include companies within the tax thresholds, whereas the UK Companies Registry (and 
America’s IRS) included data on corporations outside the thresholds. We have attempted to 
standardise definitions internationally, preferring alternative sources where the tax data are 
incomplete. Official sources that were in a position to know at least what they deemed important 
are presumed reliable, as far as they go; most problems arise from shortfalls in inclusiveness, which 
can be corrected. Thus some data sources for Germany include only AGs (we add the data for 
GmbHs - private companies - and an estimate for bergrechtliche Gewerkschaften, mining 
companies); the Russian data exclude insurance companies (we add them), while the UK data on 
registered companies exclude statutory and chartered companies (we add both). Contemporary 
statisticians disagreed on whether to exclude companies entering the bankruptcy process or only 
when finally dissolved and on when to deregister companies which merely ceased to operate; 
treatment of foreign corporations operating branches also varied. We try to standardize where 
possible (for example, usually including foreign corporations with substantial local operations). 
Remaining inconsistencies are unlikely to affect the broad picture presented here: national figures 
differ by orders of magnitude, not modest percentages.  
                              Many European and British Empire countries started publishing corporate statistics 
before the US, but official sources sometimes failed. The Blue Books of Jamaica and Mauritius, for 
example, show some well-established corporations, but not full Companies Registry information and 
                                                          
22
 Anon, “Statistique des Sociétés.” 
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we could not locate comprehensive counts for 1910 in their National Archives. Countries for which 
we could find no data had around 6% of the world’s population in 1910, but probably hosted 
relatively few corporations. Our coverage of North America, Oceania and Europe is almost 100% and 
of Asia around 90% of their populations. Coverage is lower in Latin America and Africa, though for 
both continents it includes all populous countries and well over half their total population. We 
classify our estimates at three reliability levels.23 Only a fifth - the US, Japan and most European 
economies - achieve the top A rating, while some countries with usually reliable statistics (Australia, 
Canada, France) and many developing economies are rated only B, indicating that, while there is a 
firm foundation, some  less adequately supported assumptions have to be made to extrapolate data 
or supplement incomplete sources. 45% of the countries we survey were graded only “C:” 
conjectural estimates (usually for numbers only, not capital), based on incomplete sources or private 
directories, though (with the notable exception of mainland China) these are relatively small 
countries with (apparently) few corporations. Ours will not be the last word: our online appendixes 
encourage correction by expert national chiffrephiles.                   
                  Retrospective censuses of this kind require compromises among consistency, inclusiveness 
and availability. The terms “corporation” and “company” in various versions of English (and foreign 
language equivalents) are inconsistently used by historians, lawyers and economists and at different 
times.24  Some characteristics other than separate legal personhood and entity-shielding - such as 
state authorization, multi-ownership, limited liability and perpetual succession - were commonly 
encountered (and sometimes compulsory) but not universal in all jurisdictions or all corporations; 
moreover, some non-corporate forms shared some of these corporate features. We have included 
                                                          
23
 shown selectively in Table 3, below, and, more fully, in online appendix 2. 
24
 The term “company” (like its approximate translations, société, Gesellschaft, bolag, vennootschap, kaisha 
etc.) can include partnerships (and in British Victorian English and modern American English often does), but it 
is used in modern British English as shorthand for the fully corporate form, even without a qualifying adjective 
indicating the form implied (statutory, chartered, registered, limited, joint-stock etc.). Here it is used as a 
synonym of (business) corporation in American English. Linguistic confusion has been further confounded by 
the changed usage in American English from the 1980s of the term “limited liability company.” Such newly 
legally-defined entities - having all the normal characteristics of corporations and considered corporate in most 
English-speaking countries - are now considered partnerships in the US. 
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all entities commonly accepted as corporations: including those authorized by legislatures, 
monarchs, dictators, empires, bureaucrats, magistrates and municipalities; companies with liabilities 
limited by stocks, shares, quotas, parts or guarantees, additionally subject to reserve, multiple or 
assessed liabilities, proportionally limited or even completely unlimited; statutory, chartered, 
ordered, notarized and registered companies; multi-owner corporations and corporations sole; and 
private (close and unquoted) companies as well as public (often quoted) ones.25 Hence entities 
requiring the suffixes AG, GmbH, SA, AS, NV, AB, Ltd, Inc, Pty, KK and their like are all included.  
However, cooperatives, mutuals, credit unions, savings banks, building societies, friendly societies, 
municipalities, trusts, foundations, universities (and other non-capitalist but sometimes 
incorporated forms) and limited partnerships (commandites) are generally excluded, except, in 
deference to contemporary statisticians,26 limited partnerships which issued tradable shares (such as 
the French société en commandite par actions or the Japanese kabushiki goshi kaisha). Further 
details of inclusions and sources for each country are provided in online appendix 2.  
                        Some collective business ownership was undertaken by tribes or clans, or by the 
Muslim sharika, the Sufi brotherhood, the Taiwanese ho-ku, the Chinese tang, the Bulgarian ishljem, 
the Russian arteli and so on. Such diverse multi-owner forms (and unincorporated partnerships) 
doubtless provided efficient vehicles for some purposes, but lie beyond the scope of this census. Our 
emphasis on western-style corporations is somewhat culture-specific, but we plead not guilty to 
“form-fetishism:” anachronistically imposing a modern category on uncomprehending historical 
actors. There were, it is true, Chinese mutterings against western corporate laws,27 but multicultural 
                                                          
25
 Literal translation of the German GmbH as “limited liability company” and AG as “joint stock company” is 
misleading, since each had both stocks (technically, in GmbHs, called Anleihen or “quotas”) and limited 
liability. We use the British English term “public company” to include all corporations whose shares could 
reasonably be considered publicly tradable. Not all such firms’ shares were actually traded: for the latter we 
use “publicly-traded.” An alternative usage - “public company” meaning one owned by government - is not 
intended here; state-owned companies are (willy-nilly) included only where a state owned shares in a 
normally-registered corporation. 
26
 The German, Swiss and Japanese statistical offices combined AGs with KGaAs; Saint-Léon (“Commandite”) 
commended the practice. For alternatives to the dissentient perspective of Guinnane et al (“Pouvoir”), see 
Schadee, L’inutilité;” Escarra, “Restrictions,” and (reference suppressed to preserve anonymity). 
27
 Rosenthal and Wong, Before, p. 94.  
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political correctness on this issue did not commend itself to all Asians. Japanese reformers adopted 
western corporate forms before their government imposed Franco-German-inspired legal codes 
legitimizing and circumscribing their corporate forms.28 Many mainland Chinese entrepreneurs 
preferred to register in Hong Kong rather than relying on family lineage trusts traditionally arbitrated 
by commercial chambers and Qing courts. Native Taiwanese, disliking their racial restriction to 
traditional ho-ku, co-opted Japanese shareholders to obtain access to limited liability forms.29 The 
recent extensive espousal of western-style corporations in communist China suggests that our focus 
on incorporation may not be without interest or (combined with other policies) profound 
consequences. Moreover, there is modern evidence that incorporated businesses differ both in their 
ex ante planned activities and in superior ex post performance from the unincorporated.30 We do 
not claim to measure the only organizational form which can be (or should be) measured, but it is a 
distinctive one.                                                                                    
                       Table 1 summarises the numbers of corporations in six regions, also expressed in per 
capita terms to facilitate comparison: the global (population-weighted) average was 273 
corporations per million people.31 Numerically corporations were overwhelmingly located in North 
America and Europe; indeed most corporations were in the US alone, which accounts for nearly 59% 
of those enumerated (and, even with generous allowance for omissions, above 55% of the likely 
world total).32 Measures of central tendency rank continents inconsistently, given varied mixes of 
country size and corporatization level, though North America’s lead is unambiguous. The US, with 
93% of North America’s population, completely dominates its region and similarly - in a much less 
populous region - Australia and New Zealand (both with high corporatization levels) dominate 
                                                          
28
 Miwa and Ramseyer, “Corporate Governance,” pp. 179-80 
29
 Wang, Legal, pp. 156-7. 
30
 Levine and Rubinstein, “Smart.” 
31
 for the measured population, though doubtless fewer per million for the whole world. 
32
 supporting some perspectives of Wright (Corporation Nation), while raising questions about Guinnane et al’s 
(“Pouvoir”) characterization of the USA’s business law as less advantageous for SMEs than that of major 
European countries . 
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Oceania. On the other hand, Europe’s most populous country, Russia, has the lowest European 
corporatization level,  
Table 1. World Corporatization Levels in 1910. 
Area                         Number                   ____Companies per Million Population________      Reliability 
                        _______of_________   Highest33    Mean     Weighted34    Median   Lowest35        Rating36 
                        countries  companies                                          Mean 
N. America37          3           285,009          2,913      1,626        2,849           2,032         833                  A 
Europe                 23          138,521           2,117          477           299              251           10                  A 
Oceania                 5               8,517           1,637          763        1,388              355           23                  B 
Asia                      19             13,691           1,323          721             15                17              0                  B 
Africa                   22               7,153           1,160          117             57                17              0                  B 
Latin America38   11               6,065               278         123             89                 84            34                 B 
                            ____       _______ 
World39                 83          458,956           2,913         328           273                 61              0                  A 
                                   
dragging averages down, while the UK - with less than 10% of Europe’s population - accounts for 
more than 40% of its corporations. Latin America has low levels of corporatization by all measures 
and is notably homogeneous, with a small range (among the countries surveyed) from 34 companies 
per million in Brazil to 278 per million in (highly urbanized) Uruguay. By contrast, Asia and Africa 
                                                          
33
 USA, Norway, New Zealand, Hong Kong, South-West Africa and Uruguay. 
34
 The weights are population size. 
35
 Newfoundland, Russia, New Guinea, Nepal, Ethiopia, Brazil. 
36
 See statistical appendix 2. The reliability rating applies to col 2 and is based on ratings for countries with a 
substantial majority of the corporations in that column, the exception being that corporations with A, B and C 
ratings each accounted for about one-third of the Asian total. C-rated economies tended to have small 
populations and few companies, so, on the basis of arithmetic mean country ratings, later columns in this table 
would more frequently be C-rated. 
37
 excluding Mexico: included in Latin America. 
38
 including the Caribbean. 
39
 as many countries are excluded as included, but they are mainly small, underdeveloped and with below-
average corporatization levels, accounting for 6% or so of world population. The most populous countries 
excluded were Persia and non-Ottoman Arabia, whose versions of Islamic law were unconducive to 
westernisation. They had no railways and many incorporated enterprises operating there were European 
banks, traders, shipping lines and oil prospectors, already counted elsewhere. 
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show great variation, their means (especially col 5) weighed down by populous countries like China, 
India and Nigeria, with low levels of corporatization. Their highly corporatized economies - like 
Singapore and South Africa - were (then) relatively small.  
                             Data on individual countries are given in Table 3 and the online Statistical Appendix. 
The three major industrial powers of the day - the US, Germany and UK - had the largest absolute 
numbers of corporations, but they differed considerably in penetration levels, with the US and UK at 
2,913 and 1,241 corporations per million people, respectively. Germany had only 403 per million: 
about the level of Singapore and well below other north European countries. Corporations had made 
less progress in France (306 companies per million people), Japan (101), Italy (78), Brazil (34), India 
(12), Russia (10) or China (1). And there were some countries - like Afghanistan - whose only 
corporations were occasional trespassers over their borders. Using the whole population as a scalar 
is not ideal. In Taiwan (where the figure was 12), only Japanese (3% of the population) were legally 
allowed to form corporations until 1923.40 Racial and social discrimination elsewhere was sometimes 
more subtle, but the extent to which the immigrant and/or native elites who formed corporations 
were segmented from the masses differed only in degree. Most people in America, Oceania and 
Europe would have personally encountered a corporation, but in vast tracts of Asia or Africa such 
familiarity could still not be taken for granted.  
                           Around three-quarters of the world’s corporations were in just four countries of the 
“Anglosphere” (US, Canada, UK, Australia), mainly common law nations.41  Yet, even there, much 
economic activity was not undertaken by corporations. Judging by US national income accounts, only 
around a quarter of domestic business profits was generated by corporations, though corporations 
accounted for approaching two thirds of new capital investment.42  Sole proprietorships and 
                                                          
40
 Wang, Legal, pp. 156-8. 
41
 except (civil law) Louisiana, Quebec and Scotland.  
42
 Johnson, “Functional Distribution,” p. 178; Kuznets, Capital, pp. 264-5. 
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partnerships dominated US farming, distribution, investment banking43 and the professions, while 
corporations thrived in capital-intensive transport, manufacturing and mining. In Germany, the 
corporate share of business profits was below America’s,44 but in the UK it was higher (around half), 
much of this lead resulting from Britain’s negligible agricultural sector (which had few corporations 
anywhere).45 Adjusting for corporate profits being largely a return on capital (while sole proprietors’ 
and partners’ “profits” mixed in a return on their own managerial labour), the share of corporations 
in returns to capital in British business was probably already three-quarters or more.46 For Germany, 
the low share of corporations is confirmed by employment data. In 1907, less than a fifth of German 
employees47 were in corporations: unincorporated sole proprietors and partnerships remained the 
overwhelmingly important source of German employment, even in manufacturing.48 In Belgium the 
proportion employed by corporations was nearer a third.49 Corporations had impressively expanded, 
but, even in rich countries, one has to look selectively to find measures which show they already 
dominated economic activity. 
                       The prevalence of personal (non-corporate) capitalism - in terms of business numbers 
or shares in employment - is hardly surprising in light of census data shown in Table 2 for the major 
industrial powers and the lead follower nation. A high proportion of their workforces remained in 
self-employment and the modal enterprise size was one person. The striking feature to modern 
minds (in our world in which more than half - not, as in 1900, a mere 15% - of the world’s population 
are urban and many more are employees) is how little even the richest countries had yet displaced 
                                                          
43
 Only about 3% of more than 2,000 US investment banking firms were incorporated (Goldsmith, 
“Supplementary Appendixes,” p. E21). 
44
 The Statistisches Reichsamt (Statistisches Jahrbuch 1911, pp. 406, 416-8) collected accounting data for 4,579 
AGs/KGaAs in 1909, which showed profits at 12.8% of Hoffman’s estimate for total German business profits in 
that year. Assuming compatible definitions and that the omitted AGs/KGaAs/GmbHs made profits at a similar 
rate on their known share capital, the total share would rise to 18.0%. 
45
 Worswick and Tipping, Profits, pp. 30, 47, 111-16; Feinstein, National Income, pp.157, T74. 
46
 Johnson (“Functional ”) and Stamp (British Incomes, pp. 303-5) for guesstimates of the functional 
distribution. 
47
 in Gewerbe, a term which then included manufacturing, mining, quarrying, construction, entertainment, 
hospitality, distribution, finance, market gardening, livestock breeding, fishing and some transport and utilities, 
but not the liberal professions, railways, post, telegraphs, telephones, agriculture or forestry. 
48
 Passow, Aktiengesellschaft, p. 25. 
49
 Baudhuin, Capital, p. 34. 
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traditional, small-scale businesses in which a peasant-farmer, shopkeeper, merchant or craftsman 
had knowledge and control of his whole business. Small wonder, then, that there was distrust of 
large employers, not to speak of bourgeois fears that the shrinkage of the creative realm of 
entrepreneurial sole proprietors by corporate capitalism would drive the masses to socialism. The 
UK had gone farthest down this uncharted road: the proportion of Britons who were employers or 
self-employed was less than half that of other nations. We can infer from Table 2 that the mean 
Table 2.  Distribution of Civilian Working Population: Five Countries. 
Country and Year                   Employers and          Salaried and Waged  
                                                 Self-Employed %            Employees % 
UK 1911                                         12.3                               87.7      
Germany 1907                             26.1                               73.9 
US 1910                                         30.0                              70.0              
Japan 1920                                   32.9                               67.1              
France 1906                                  52.6                              47.4                                                          
 
Sources: authors’ calculations from Feinstein, National Income, p. 227; Historical Statistics of the 
United States; Toutain, “Population,” Table 66; Woytinsky, Welt, II, pp. 13-14; Bank of Japan, 
Hundred-Year, p. 52. 
 
employer hired about one person (in addition to the proprietor) in France, two in America and 
Japan, three in Germany, but nearer seven in the UK.50  
                         But, even among giant enterprises, the age of the unincorporated sole proprietorship 
and partnership was barely drawing to a close. It was only in the last decade or so that some of 
America’s and Britain’s largest firms - including Baldwin Locomotive, Carnegie Steel, Du Pont, 
Baring’s Bank and Imperial Tobacco - had incorporated, while others - like JP Morgan and Rothschild 
                                                          
50
 figures derived by dividing column 2  by column 1. The largest employer (the government) and many 
corporate employers of those in col 2 were significant but not counted, while multiple partners in col 1 might 
jointly own one business, but the appropriate adjustments to the denominator (col. 1) - with its enormous 
weight of sole proprietors - would be trivial and in opposite directions. 
14 
 
(merchant banking), American Express (rail and financial services),51 I & R Morley (textiles) and W H 
Smith (chain retailing) - still remained partnerships. The peak organisations of the major Japanese 
zaibatsu - Mitsui and Mitsubishi - were partnerships, though many subsidiaries were incorporated. 
Europe’s largest chemical business (Belgium’s Solvay) and France’s leading steel producer 
(Schneider) and rubber manufacturer (Michelin) remained partnerships, as did the Oppenheim Bank 
and Merck and Henkel (chemicals) in Germany.52 Wealth was unequally distributed both within and 
among nations and the world’s richest man - John D Rockefeller - could have afforded personally to 
buy control of almost any global corporation. Although this dollar billionaire chose to hold only 25% 
of Standard Oil (his main corporate asset), many multi-millionaires owned other large businesses 
outright, sometimes still in unincorporated form.  
                                                                                       II 
            An alternative measure of corporatization - paid-up share capital53 - gives more weight to 
large enterprises. In a period of stable prices,54 par values roughly reflected the value of corporate 
capital paid in, but usually undervalued reinvested profits and organisational capabilities 
developed.55 This measure is available for fewer than half the countries for which we have corporate 
numbers, though they account for over nine-tenths of extant corporations. Table 3 shows a 
narrower range for capital values - normalised, conventionally, as a percentage of GDP (col 2)56 - 
than corporate numbers per million population (col 1), but a broadly similar ranking (Spearman’s 
                                                          
51
 Until 1965 a “joint stock association,” technically an unincorporated organization, similar to British “deed-of-
settlement” companies. Few of either form survived in 1910, but some were quoted on stock exchanges and 
we have included them in this census. 
52
 In the case of Michelin, Mitsubishiomit, Schneider and the three German firms, commandites with shares, so 
included in our census, though Mitsubishi and Solvay were commandites simples and Mitsui an unlimited 
partnership, and thus excluded, though their incorporated subsidiaries are counted. Mitsubishi incorporated in 
1937, Solvay in 1967. Michelin remains a partnership today, though with one corporate partner and many 
incorporated subsidiaries.  
53
 Where possible we report data on paid-up capital but for exceptions see online appendix 2. 
54
 when most 1910 companies had been incorporated, there had been mild deflation in gold-standard 
countries up to 1896 and mild inflation thereafter. 
55
 though these were sometimes reflected in bonus share issues (“stock dividends” in American English). 
56
 Countries are ranked by descending order in col. 2. Logically we should calculate corporate capital as a 
percentage of total capital, but national estimates of capital stocks are less comparable than GDP estimates. 
Capital/GDP – a ratio of a stock to a flow - lacks any clear economic rationale, but is conventional. 
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rank correlation coefficient is 0.78). However some poor enclave economies (Egypt, Brazil) rank 
much higher by capital/GDP, while (rich) Australia falls. The UK replaces Norway as European leader, 
while Hong Kong - Asia’s main trading node - overtakes the US as global leader. Many mainland 
Chinese entrepreneurs opted to register in Hong Kong, relying on its independent courts and 
political culture rather than Beijing autocracy, as their successors still do after the colony’s recent 
integration into China.57 One of the first companies registered there under its 1865 Companies 
Ordinance, the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, had by 1910 extended well beyond its eponymous cities: 
it was a global deposit, exchange and investment bank, with branches throughout Asia and in 
America and Europe.  
  Table 3. Corporatization Indicators by Country, 1910.  
Country                                 Corporations per            Corporate stock values at par/GDP %      Reliability 
                                               million population                     (at “market value” in brackets)         Index58             
Hong Kong *                                    1,323                                      480                           (1286)                B 
Canada*                                           2,032                                      206                             (220)                B                        
US*                                                    2,913                                      173                             (156)                A                 
UK*                                                    1,241                                      162                            (256)                 A                                     
South Africa*                                       901                                      120                             (240)                B                
Netherlands                                     1,262                                         85                              (149)               A                                                               
Belgium                                                561                                         80                              (104)               A                                                         
Switzerland                                       1,060                                        75                               (127)              A                    
Sweden                                              1,055                                        66                                 na                 A 
Brazil                                                        34                                        63                               (106)              B                                                                
New Zealand*                                   1,637                                        54                                 na                 B 
Egypt                                                        20                                        51                             (100)                B                                                                                                                            
France                                                    306                                        51                               (76)                B                                                                
Norway                                               2,117                                        49                               (61)                A                                                                     
                                                          
57
 Huang, Capitalism, pp. 5-6. 
58
 See online statistical appendix 2. The index relates to column 1 but usually also applies to col 2; for the 
market/par ratios used in col 3 see statistical appendix 1. 
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Germany                                                403                                        44                               (71)                A 
Romania                                                   68                                        43                             (100)                B 
Denmark                                                998                                        42                               (45)                A                                                                   
Finland                                                   755                                        41                                na                  A 
Argentina                                                 84                                        37                               (46)                B                                                                                            
Hungary                                                 134                                        34                               (54)                A                                                              
Australia*                                           1,545                                        33                              (69)                 B                                                                    
Russia                                                        10                                        33                              na                   B                                                                     
Japan                                                       101                                       32                              (56)                 A                    
Italy                                                            78                                       31                              (40)                 A                                
Spain                                                        106                                       27                              (52)                 B                                                            
Austria                                                       70                                       26                              (47)               A 
Netherlands East Indies                         46                                       25                              (44)               C                              
British India*                                            12                                       24                              (35)               B 
Philippines*                                              39                                      22                                na                 B 
Bulgaria                                                     32                                      11                                na                 A 
China                                                           1                                        9                                 na                 C                                                                                                                                                                                              
Korea                                                           6                                       6                                   (9)               B                                                                
Afghanistan                                                0                                       0                                   (0)               A                               
Nepal                                                           0                                       0                                   (0)               B 
 
Countries in this table:59 
                              Mean                         664                                    64                               (130) 
                           Median                        120                                    42                                  (69) 
All 83 countries surveyed: 
                              Mean                        328                                    na                                  na 
                           Median                          61                                    na                                  na 
                                 
                                                          
59
 34 for col 2, 27 for col 3. The excluded majority lack capital data and are generally ranked C for reliability. 
Judging by the means and medians reported above, they were less corporatized than those in the table. 
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*Common law countries. Argentina and Egypt are counted as civil law countries, though a 
substantial portion of their corporate capital was registered under foreign common law. South Africa 
technically maintained Roman-Dutch civil law (Union Office, Official, p. 390), but in corporate affairs 
had adopted English statute law and common law juries: we count it as a common law jurisdiction. 
The Philippines are similarly shown as common law (although they maintained the Spanish civil code, 
American-style statutes and common law practices were introduced following the military 
occupation).                                                         
Source: online appendixes 
 
                     Some differentials are explained by political choices: the nationalization of railways or 
municipal ownership of electricity removed enterprises from the capitalist corporate sector.  Thus 
the US, UK or Canada (where investor-owned railways were among the largest companies) naturally 
had higher corporate capital/GDP ratios than Australia, Germany or Japan (where the state owned 
most railways).60 Even after controlling for this effect, large differences persist. For example, 
deducting railway capital from both countries’ corporate capital, Germany still registers one-third 
(rather than, as in Table 3 col. 2, one-quarter) of the ratio of the US.61  
                       The US also had more “overcapitalized” firms, reflecting its weak regulation of capital 
subscriptions, though this was mainly transparent to investors and naturally reflected in lower 
market prices for US than European stocks.62 The available stock indexes showing market/par ratios 
typically encompass only a fraction of quoted companies, are inconsistently weighted and (by 
definition) exclude all private companies. The adjustment (shown in brackets in Table 3 col. 3) should 
be interpreted as a crude indicator of the direction in which par value/GDP ratios are biased by 
national propensities to overcapitalize (assumed to apply to all firms not just those in the index), not 
as a measure of realizable market values. This crude correction raises Germany to 46% of the US 
level and combining this with the rail correction would raise it further to above half. The market 
value correction also propels the UK’s ratio well above the USA’s, though Britain’s corporate capital 
                                                          
60
 Since railway companies were generally large they had little impact on corporate numbers. 
61
 Appropriate sectoral information is not generally available, but see online appendix 2, for this and other 
examples. 
62
 Navin and Sears, “Rise,” p. 132; Pistor et al, “Evolution,” pp. 821-3. For market/par ratios see online 
Appendix 1. 
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remains below America’s in absolute terms. The US then had 2.1 times the UK’s population and 3.3 
times the UK’s GDP at current prices and market exchange rates.63 However, British corporations 
had most foreign direct investments (in absolute as well as relative terms), while Russia and the US 
were leading international debtors. Much of the proportionately greater capital in UK-
headquartered companies was actually invested in continental Europe, the Americas, Asia-Pacific 
and Africa.64 Such cross-border enterprises were less likely than domestic businesses to be directly 
owned by individuals and more likely to incorporate.  
                  The US led the world in numbers of corporations, while the UK had higher corporate 
capital values (at market as a proportion of GDP). Other British Empire countries with common law 
systems also populate the top of the table, though some colonies had low levels of corporatization. 
The international division of labour directed the latter to sectors (like agriculture) with a low 
propensity to incorporate. Native traditions and colonial inequalities also inhibited their human 
capital formation, conducive to a modern corporate economy. Thus India’s population was 
dominated by its poor rural peasantry in 1910 and had few corporations, though it was twelve times’ 
China’s level by numbers per capita and approaching three times by capital/GDP ratio. In India’s big 
coastal cities, where a literate local bourgeoisie prospered, incorporation by natives rivalled that by 
whites, judging by the corporate names registered, for example in Bombay, and the local investors’ 
share was rising.65 Although most of India’s large-scale corporate capital - notably in railways and 
banking - was British-owned and imperially-chartered in London, its domestically-registered 
corporations were smaller. Some European colonies with modest numbers of white settlers - Hong 
Kong, Malaya, Singapore, Samoa and New Caledonia - had levels of corporatization above that of 
                                                          
63
 www.measuringworth.com. Maddison (World Economy, pp.427, 463) estimates US real GDP at only 2.2 
times the UK’s. Current prices and market exchange rates - faced by corporations and cross-border investors - 
are preferred here.   
64
 Corley, “British Overseas Investment;” Hannah, “Multinationality;” Jones, Evolution, p. 30; Worswick and 
Tipping, Profits, pp. 101, 116, 118. Our sources generally allocate direct investments to the home economy and 
portfolio investments to the host economy. Thus the large UK portfolio investments in US corporations are 
here counted as American, not British.  
65
 Ray, Industrialization, p. 52. 
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independent Japan, while other Asian countries (including American and Japanese colonies) 
generally did not.66    
                                                                                      III                             
                     A legally separate private company form existed in only a few jurisdictions before 1914, 
though these included two of the world’s largest industrial economies.67 In both Germany and the 
UK, private companies were already a numerical majority, though not yet dominant in terms of 
share capital. Most companies elsewhere were also de facto private, in the sense that they were 
closely held by relatively few shareholders and not quoted on stock exchanges. There were already 
many corporations with only one owner and some had no employees.68 One motive for such 
incorporations was limiting the owner’s personal liability, sometimes clearly to defraud creditors.69 
However, as judges were observed to refuse to “pierce the corporate veil,” creditors were 
increasingly on their guard against such wiles: banks insisted on personal guarantees for unsecured 
loans, over-riding the owner’s limited liability. At the other end of the scale, many companies were 
formed to raise capital on public markets, permitting the achievement of lower capital costs, 
economies of scale or other competitive advantages by large quoted companies with multiple 
owners (shareholder numbers, by 1910, already reached six figures in a few companies in Europe 
and the US).  
                                                          
66
 online statistical appendix 2. The use of the corporate from was more intensive among European than Asian 
inhabitants (Grist, Nationality). 
67
 Additionally to Germany from 1892 and the UK from 1907 (and parts of their empires), versions of the 
private company dated from 1884 in Mexico (though abandoned in 1888), 1896 in Victoria, 1901 in Portugal 
and 1906 in Austria and Ecuador. Later adopters included Poland (1919), Spain (1919), Chile (1923), France 
(1925), Cuba (1929), Luxemburg (1933), Mexico (1934), Belgium and Palestine (1935), Yugoslavia and 
Switzerland (1937), Japan (1940) and Italy (1942).  
68
 Information on owner numbers is sparse, but a Berlin Handelskammer survey of 1905 indicated that 10% of 
GmbHs had only one owner (two were required on formation, but, unlike in the UK before 1992, there was no 
penalty for subsequent reduction) and 66% between two and five (Fränkel, GmbH, pp. 149-50). See also Fuller 
(“Incorporated Individual”) for US cases. 
69
 In Saloman v Saloman (1897) what - to a moral observer unstained by legal training - was plainly a fraud on 
creditors received English judicial blessing (Johnson, Making, pp. 153-9), though American judges initially 
flirted with more righteous alter ego interpretations (Fuller, “Incorporated Individual”). 
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                        Nations sometimes tilted the balance by placing restrictions on SME incorporation. 
Minimum numbers of three to ten founding shareholders were commonly specified, though in 
Germany, the UK and Japan the limit had been reduced to two. Where limits remained, “dummy” 
holders with negligible shareholdings could be used to evade them. Even where general 
incorporation was allowed, entry to specific industries like railways, mining, insurance or banking 
was in some countries restricted. Professionals like doctors, lawyers and stockbrokers often could 
not incorporate, nor could new sugar mills in Taiwan (from 1910), nor retailers in Pennsylvania (until 
1901). California’s 1879 constitution required proportional (not limited) liability, a distinctive 
corporate regime which (until 1933) restricted (without removing) any individual’s liability in multi-
owner enterprises, but left de facto sole proprietors with full individual liability. Despite this, at our 
census date of 1910 California had more corporations per capita than any other US state (and hence 
than any state on earth), so there were clearly other drivers than liability limitation, even among 
SMEs.  
                    Small capitalists were also deterred from incorporating in some jurisdictions by 
discriminatory taxation, high fees or restrictive rules for registration, renewal or notarization, or high 
minimum amounts of capital.70 For example, in Russia the normal minimum was R70,000 
($35,000),71 in Germany M20,000 ($5,000),72 in Delaware $1,000 and in New York only $500.73 A high 
threshold size was self-evidently a constraint on incorporating smaller SMEs,74 but even in the UK - 
with no size restriction - almost no companies were formed with less than New York’s minimum 
capital ($500/£100, or less than two years’ unskilled wages). Indeed, only 9% of new UK formations 
in 1901-10 had less than £1,000 ($5,000, M20,000) nominal capital - the German minimum  - so this 
                                                          
70
 Rousseau, Compte rendu. 
71
 R30,000 for enterprises “of public utility” (Peacock, Russian Year-Book, p.24).  
72
 authorized capital for GmbHs, of which only M5,000 had to be paid-up, though owners of such companies 
were liable for the unpaid M15,000. AGs had a lower minimum (M7,000), but other conditions dissuaded SMEs 
from using that form. 
73
 Kuhn, Comparative study, p. 107. 
74
 One-fifth of GmbHs at the time of our census had just the minimum M20,000 capital and in the 1920s - 
when hyper-inflation negated the limit - there was a rapid multiplication of small GmbHs (Zahn, Statistik, p. 
457; Anon, “Grundungstätigkeit,” pp.63-5). 
21 
 
contributes little to explaining why the UK had more than three times Germany’s corporations per 
capita.75 
                  On the other hand, stock markets were then accessible to much smaller companies than is 
the case today. They also offered lower costs of listing and trading and were more numerous: the 
US, UK and Japan each had dozens of exchanges; New Zealand, with only a million people, had six; 
Norway, with 2.3 million, had nine.76 Some markets remained informal.77  Bogota had no formal 
exchange until 1929 but already in 1910 the Colombian press reported stock prices.78 Some 
exchanges had private order rules enforced by elected committees of brokers; elsewhere state 
authorization was required, though government regulation generally remained light compared with 
today. Nonetheless the information, reputation and liquidity benefits of centralised trading gave 
large exchanges some natural monopoly features. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Listing 
Committee was unique in using its market power to discourage IPOs below $5m (so most quoted US 
industrials were not listed there), but issues one-hundredth that size and upwards were readily 
traded on the NY curb, regional markets, at auction or over the counter. London, St Petersburg, 
Berlin, Hamburg and Frankfurt all had a lower (M1m/R500,000/ $250,000/£50,000) minimum (and 
thus attracted a higher share of national listings), while provincial exchanges accepted issues half 
that size.79 Small countries’ exchanges specified even lower minima (Belgrade’s was only F100,000, 
                                                          
75
 Authors’ calculations from data in Board, Companies, p. 5. Smaller GmbHs were allowed in Austria and in 
1910 19% of them, accounting for just over 1% of paid-up capital in GmbHs, were in those with less than 
K20,000 capital (K20,000 was about 80% of the authorized capital limit in Germany of M20,000, though paid-
up capital could be below authorized capital). Switzerland appears not to have published data on size classes 
until 1930, when 24% of its companies, accounting for 0.2% of capital, were in the lowest range of SF10,000 
($2,000) or less authorized capital. If mean corporate sizes (Table 4) are a reliable indicator, perhaps more US 
than UK companies were below the $5,000 threshold; for inconclusive earlier evidence see Falkner, 
“Statistics,” pp. 60-4.   
76
 For pre-1914 stock markets see Green et al, Men; Lavington, English; Michie, Global; Swoboda, Arbitrage; 
Taeuber, Börsen. Some countries (e.g. Siam, Korea, Tunisia, Jamaica) had no formal exchange, China (with a 
population of 423m) only two (expatriate enclaves in Hong Kong and Shanghai) and India (with a population of 
314m) a more multicultural five (Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Ahmedabad and Rangoon). All also had access to 
overseas markets, notably London. 
77
 including the NY curb (though that was soon reorganized as a formal market) and English automobile shares 
(Coventry) and cotton shares (Oldham). 
78
 Means, Underdevelopment, pp. xvi, 289, n. 58. 
79
 legislated limits, except for London, where it was conventional advice (Bircham and Morris, Public 
Companies, p.6), with exceptions occasionally permitted.  
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about $20,000), but irreducible fixed costs made many intermediated IPOs below $100,000 
expensive anywhere. That did not prevent banks, breweries, cotton mills and shop chains 
distributing their own stock locally among favoured managers, employees, customers, suppliers, 
relatives and acquaintances, without using formal channels, some literally selling their shares “over 
the counter.” If there was demand, local brokers or the companies themselves might decide to make 
a market.  
                      By 1900, when the global number of companies remained below that of 1910, 51,000 of 
them were already known to the hundred investment analysts at Crédit Lyonnais’ Paris office.80 Ten 
years’ later the global total that were in some sense “quoted” probably exceeded 100,00081  - over a 
fifth of existing companies - but informality and small scale had consequences for the meaning of 
that statement that today’s observer of (the much smaller share of) modern corporations that are 
listed on today’s (more highly regulated) exchanges might misinterpret.82 In the UK, for example, 
more than ten thousand companies appeared in directories of traded securities, but, at any one 
time, only around six hundred had an active market - with numerous bargains marked six days a 
week with minimal bid-ask spreads - on the London Stock Exchange.83 On the other hand, regional 
exchanges, or those in small countries, sometimes only opened an hour or two a day or even only 
one day a week and some “listed” securities on an exchange like Lisbon or Colorado Springs might 
trade only a couple of times a year (with bid-ask spreads sometimes as high as 50%) or not at all. 
Most shareholders were individuals rather than institutions and many bought to hold.  
                                                          
80
 Fridenson, “Stock Certification,” p. 69. Comparing the bank’s surviving files with Moody’s Manual and the 
Stock Exchange Official Intelligence suggests that this total excluded many small quoted companies in the 
Anglosphere.  
81
 For the US alone (if we count many small banks with limited local markets) the figure was 20,000 or more in 
1907 (Moody’s Manual). 
82
 Some modern exchanges are similar: only 60 of the 569 companies listed on Karachi trade regularly 
(Economist, 27 July 2013, p. 66)  
83
 Skinner’s Stock Exchange Year Book 1914 listed some 13,500 companies, including 730 registered overseas 
and 2,643 British-registered but mainly operating overseas (Houston and Dunning, UK Industry, pp. 37, 40). 
 
23 
 
                     There were, of course, speculative investors and arbitrageurs: London, Paris, 
Amsterdam, Brussels and New York welcomed such activity, while in Berlin it was discouraged. Bank 
lending on the security of shares and short-term investments of idle balances boosted daily turnover 
in easily-traded securities. “Stagging” of new issues by speculative subscribers was widespread and 
markets existed to raise start-up as well as expansion capital (they fulfilled some of the functions of 
the modern venture capitalist as well as floating established firms). Speculators underpinned the 
secondary market liquidity that supported that function. Most shareholders were already passive 
rentiers, but shareholder “voice” remained a serious option (sometimes bolstered by voting rules 
favouring small holders and by activist shareholder intervention in board elections, annual meetings 
and shareholder investigation committees), at a time when shareholder numbers remained modest 
(hundreds or thousands, rather than millions). “Exit” (getting out by selling in the market) - or 
contested takeovers - were correspondingly less favoured as responses to director misdeeds or 
underperformance.84 With many buyers investing for the long term, the ratio of market turnover to 
market capitalisation was much lower than today. Such differences arguably deserve as much 
attention as those that have dominated the debate about historical - relative to modern - stock 
market sizes. 
                         Corporate size distributions were skewed, with modest numbers of very large 
corporations and a long tail of small ones. For example, the largest hundred UK corporations - those 
with £4m+ ($20m+) capital, mainly quoted banks, manufacturers, mines and railways - in 1910 alone 
accounted for over two-fifths of the £3,328m paid-up share capital in the 55,747 companies in this 
census and over three-fifths of the capital of the around ten thousand domestic companies that had 
quoted securities.85 Size distributions were only sparsely reported but they appear to be similar in 
other countries in 1910 and less skewed to giant firms than is the case today.86 The skewness of all 
                                                          
84
 Green et al, eds., Men, pp. 000-00. 
85
 Authors’ calculations from data in the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence 1911, with an allowance for large 
private companies. 
86
compare http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/historic/main-market/dec-13.pdf (accessed 26 
February 2014) 
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firm size distributions (with a tendency to approximate to the lognormal) is a well-attested empirical 
law of modern social science and was already discerned in early twentieth century data.87  Of course, 
size distributions for corporations alone tend to be truncated (sole proprietorships and partnerships 
occupy much of the lower tail) and a fortiori for quoted corporations (smaller corporations were 
rarely quoted, even in 1910).  
                           We can reasonably presume that, worldwide, most giant companies (if not state-
owned) were already then quoted, as they remain today. However, because of the proliferation of 
exchanges and off-exchange trading, the boundary between quoted and unquoted companies was 
less clear in 1910 than today (one reason why historians hotly dispute the sizes of stock markets, 
which appear uncontroversial to modern analysts). Nonetheless, it is evident that in Europe well 
over half of the par value of corporate capital shown in Table 3 was quoted on a formal exchange.88  
In the UK, the proportion appearing in the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence (which covered many, 
but not all, markets besides the LSE) was about 75% of all corporate paid-up share capital;89 on six 
Italian exchanges, the quoted proportion was 70%; while the Berlin exchange alone accounted for 
two-thirds of Prussia’s share capital (with, probably, a higher ratio for all exchanges in Germany 
overall). In Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Egypt, France, India, Japan and New Zealand quoted 
capital also dominated (including, for some of these countries, that quoted on foreign stock 
exchanges).  
                     On the other hand, Moody’s Manual - which covered not only the few hundred 
corporations listed on the NYSE but many thousands more traded on the dozens of other exchanges, 
or on over-the-counter, auction and curb markets - lists only around 40% of corporate share capital.  
The USA’s unparalleled numerical proliferation of companies - already noted - created a different 
                                                          
87
 Gibrat, Inégalités. 
88
 The remainder of this paragraph is based on online statistical appendix 2. On possible reasons for high levels 
of stock exchange development, see Morck, ed., History, Burhop (“Technik”), Goetzmann and Ukhov (“British 
investment”), Hautcoeur and Riva, “Paris,” Franks et al (“Spending”), Foreman-Peck and Hannah (“Extreme 
Divorce”), Fohlin (Mobilizing), Campbell and Turner (‘Substitutes’), Musacchio  (Experiments). 
89
 perhaps nearer 67% if shares that appeared in the directory but were privately held - because only part of a 
company’s capital was traded - is omitted. 
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pattern. Unusually, most of its quoted capital (by value) was traded elsewhere than on its major 
metropolitan exchange (the NYSE) and it also had a longer tail of unquoted companies, the latter 
alone accounting for most corporate capital. Such a large share of private companies in paid-up 
capital was then rare, but is now the global norm.90   
                         The average US company had less capital than non-US ones, even at par and more 
distinctly so at market. Hence, these figures imply that a majority of world corporate share capital by 
value was quoted around the time of our 1910 census (a higher portion than today), yet the ratio of 
world equity market capitalisation to global GDP remained distinctly lower than today’s.91 
 
                                                                                            IV 
                                  Table 4 col. 1 shows the share capital of the mean company by country (at par), 
converted to US$, with similar indicators (cols. 2 and 3) for publicly-quoted companies (at market 
and par). Legally-defined categories of public and private are not used here, because few national 
statisticians then distinguished capital in this way. Our preferred indicator of quoted company 
capitals is the mean value of share listings on their major stock exchange, available for more 
countries at market than at par.92 Of course companies listed on major exchanges were larger than 
those traded on regional exchanges and, a fortiori, larger than public companies defined legally 
(many traded infrequently or not at all). The proportion of companies listed on major metropolitan 
exchanges differed more than the ratio of these companies’ capital to GDP. For example, the St 
Petersburg exchange listed as many as one in six Russian companies, while the NYSE listed only 
around one in a thousand North American ones, so their main stock market capitalizations were 
                                                          
90
 n.3, above.  
91
 In recent years the World Federation of Stock Exchanges shows the combined equity capitalisation of its 
exchanges as above 100% of global GDP. Deducting the private portions from the GDP ratios in Table 3, 
perhaps only half a dozen countries (including only one of the four largest industrial economies: the UK but not 
the US, Germany or France) would have exceeded 100% before 1914. 
92
 Figures for 1910 are in most cases an average per equity security: usually lower than per company because a 
company can issue more than one type of equity. For some countries figures are available only per company 
and for nearby years. 
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much closer relative to GDP than their total corporate capital (including unquoted corporations) in 
Table 3.  
                        Given skewed firm size distributions, the figures in cols 2 and 3 are highly sensitive to 
the numbers to which they relate, shown in brackets after the average capital. America’s 298 NYSE-
listed corporate stocks appear more than twice as large as the LSE’s 1,198 “officially-listed,” but if we 
take a similar number of large UK-owned quoted firms, their sizes are close together.  No European 
industrial could match the size of the freak US Steel merger, but focus on such outliers seriously 
misleads: lower down the manufacturing size range and in banking, mining and other sectors many 
European corporations approached or exceeded American scale. British corporations, in particular, 
had more multinational investments serving wider markets.93 The relatively low US ranking in 
column 1 reinforces the point that American “exceptionalism” consisted not in the NYSE’s corporate 
giants but in its numerous closely-held corporate SMEs. 
Table 4. Mean Sizes of all Companies (at par), arranged in descending order of mean size; and of 
publicly-traded Companies (at market and par), ca 1910. 
 
  Country                    __________________Mean Share Capital (US$)___________________________ 
a. Countries with Large Corporations 
                                    All Companies        Publicly-traded Companies               Publicly-traded Companies      
                                          at par94                      at market                                            at par     
                                                                       (number in brackets)                      (number in brackets) 
 
Argentina                     2,476,885                     16,391,893† (117) 
 
Brazil                             2,279,27695                      2,646,249† (294) 
 
Chile                             2,121,05396                       5,251,350 (68)                       2,233,381 (68) 
                                              
Russia                           1,701,936                        1,824,440† (316) 
China                            1,314,851 
Egypt                            1,155,092                        9,562,249 (75)  
                                                          
93
 See notes 55 and 73 above. 
94
 Except where footnoted, figures in this column relate to the numbers of companies in Table 3 and online 
statistical appendix 2. 
95
 São Paolo companies only. 
96
 114 industrial companies only in 1916. The next two columns relate to 1917. 
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Mexico                            719,00297  
Uruguay                          574,89198 
Austria                            483,740                         5,379,315 (228) 
India                               410,339 
7 German Colonies      398,17199 
Hong Kong                    384,979  
  
 
b. Countries with Mid-Sized Corporations  
Italy                                 358,054                        2,818,218 (251)                   2,202,063 (251) 
Romania                         345,277                      
South Africa                  327,554                         7,081,504 (133) 
France                            321,394                      23,063,010 (146)                 2,416,761 (720) 
UK                                    290,540                      14,065,640 (1,198)           27,815,556 (337)100  
Canada                           276,511                       6,100,000 (160)                             
Belgium                          274,211                       1,314,710 (833) 
Hungary                         253,464                       3,020,453 (93)101 
Greece                            237,793102 
Philippines                     224,607 
US                                    214,234                     34,940,140 (294)             39,741,497 (294)103 
Germany                        187,963                        4,756,659 (910)                                                                               
                                                          
97
 Average of new registrations, 1886-1910. 
98
 Average of new registrations, 1910-13. 
99
 1913 data 
100
 1911 data, from Foreman- Peck and Hannah (2012). The 1911 mean market value of these 337 larger 
companies (which are per company not per security) was $37,272,844. 
101
 1908 data for Budapest non-railway companies only. 
102
 Average of sample of 138 new registrations, 1840-1909. 
103
 The NYSE data at par are from Pratt (assumed to comprise the same number as Moore found quotations for 
in 1910) and relate to 1911, while the market capitalization data in the previous column (from Moore) relate 
to 1910.  
28 
 
Bulgaria                          180,298 
Spain                               168,080                     10,248,000 (40)                                              
                                                           
 c.  Countries with Small Corporations   
Korea                               152,431 
Australia                         149,889                   1,695,399 (213)                      
Switzerland                    140,035                   2,968,667 (120) 
Straits Settlements104    138,678105 
Neths E Indies                128,260 
Japan                               125,819                   5,146,182 (55)                     2,766,402 (119)106                        
New Zealand                 118,608 
Sweden                          101,593                    6,709,097† (108) 
Netherlands                   92,398                     2,801,431 (377) 
Norway                           82,903                        967,546† (80) 
Denmark                        74,276                      1,941,603† (114) 
Finland                           47,773                                         
Sources:  cols.1 and 3: online appendix 2.  
col 2: Moore (“World” Tables II and IV) for ten countries (we are grateful to Lyndon Moore for 
providing precise figures for average capital). Moore’s data relate to December 1910 and are 
confined to the major national exchange (except for Canada, which includes both Montreal and 
Toronto) and sometimes to actively-traded equity shares, rather than all listed or traded companies. 
He includes foreign as well as domestic quoted companies, if they are listed on the domestic 
exchange, and counts each security separately (the numbers of securities is higher than the number 
of companies because some firms issued both ordinary and preference stock). Data with a † are for 
1913 and derived from Rajan and Zingales (2003, Tables 2 and 5), including only domestic 
corporations and relating to companies, not securities. Their averages - Australia $5,108,389, France 
$13,440,782, Italy $1,770,612, Japan $3,208,129, the Netherlands $1,557,951, Switzerland 
$4,712,209, the US $33,284,483 - differ from Moore’s. With the exception of Australia and 
Switzerland, Moore’s figures (preferred in col. 2) are higher: often because including foreign quoted 
                                                          
104
 Singapore, Penang, Malacca. 
105
 1916 data, locally-registered companies only 
106
 The higher number of companies than of securities in the previous column arises because the newspaper 
sources used omitted at least half of the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s listed companies (see online appendix 2): it 
was generally the smaller listed companies that were not reported in the press. Rajan and Zingales figures for 
1913 for 389 companies (including some quoted on other Japanese stock exchanges) show a smaller average 
size at market of $3,208,129.  
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companies raises the mean, more than dividing by securities rather than companies reduces it, 
though there are other reasons for the variations: for example, Rajan and Zingales (but not Moore) 
include multiple exchanges for the US and Japan. Some figures from Rajan and Zingales (UK, Cuba, 
Chile, India) are discarded because, on the basis of their unpublished data appendix, they appear to 
be inaccurate/unsupported. For the capitalization of the Alexandria (Egypt) bourse in 1913 and for 
Chile the figures in Anon (“Statistique des Sociétés”) and for Belgium the January 1911 figure from 
Neymarck (“Statistique,” 1912) are substituted (see online appendix 2 for justification).                                                    
 
 
         The means in column 1 offend other conventional wisdoms. The literature on why 
Argentina had the largest companies in the world and Japan among the smallest, or on why Italian 
companies were larger than German ones, is somewhat sparse. The paradox is simply resolved:  the 
literature highlights conspicuous examples in the numerator (reflected in cols. 2 and 3), while the 
averages in col. 1 are driven by the denominator (the means are lower where corporations had 
higher numerical penetration).  Finland (then an autonomous Grand Duchy within the Russian 
Empire) had the smallest companies in the table: its independent liberal legislation fostered many 
companies per million people. By contrast, partnerships in Russia proper (which in Finland would 
have incorporated) did not seek the Tsar’s permission to incorporate. “Laggards” in Table 3 (col 1) 
are naturally “leaders” in Table 4 (col 1). Note, however, that this does not generally apply to Asian 
countries. These often had relatively few companies per million people, but their companies were 
still relatively small.       
                           The distinctive grouping of countries ranked by the mean capital of all their 
corporations in col. 1 is remarkable. The top (“a”) division of Table 4 consists almost exclusively of 
enclave economies in which large foreign enterprises dominated their corporate economies.107 Only 
one corporation - a Khedival concession granted to French capitalists in 1858 - drives Egypt’s result 
in 1910. The Suez Canal, paying reliable dividends around 36%, was quoted on the Alexandria, 
London and Paris stock exchanges at more than eight times par, accounting for half Egypt’s equity 
                                                          
107
 Austria is an exception: its corporate law and taxes had been restrictive (Eddie, “Economic policy,” p. 872). 
Its GmbHs had already overtaken the number of AGs three years after their introduction, but had still not 
reduced its mean company size to the European norm. 
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market valuation.108 Elsewhere, if less extremely, much enclave corporate capital was foreign-owned 
and traded mainly on overseas stock exchanges. In some of these countries a racially-distinct, or 
distinctly immigrant, merchant-financier elite also dominated much domestic enterprise.109 Given 
technological and financial disparities, political independence did not innoculate against enclave 
capital: most “a” economies were not colonies. Monopolistic or oligopolistic firms with crony 
capitalist links to government (often involving privileged concessions or financial access) were 
common, indeed more common than in colonies with relatively clean, liberal bureaucrats and 
deferential subalterns. Manufacturing corporations were typically more locally-owned than those in 
infrastructure and raw materials, but there is scant evidence of a significant and vibrant local private 
company sector in these economies; indeed the average size of all companies is near to that of those 
quoted on their major stock market. In Rio de Janeiro, only 49 of the 199 companies noted in the 
Jornal de Comercio were not registered with the Rio stock exchange and Brazil was by no means the 
least hospitable to new entry or most prone to crony capitalism: indeed the consensus is that it had 
relatively vibrant locally-owned companies and banks by the standards of Porfirian Mexico.110 This 
paucity of private companies may be a reflection at the corporate level of the domestic inequalities 
in these societies of wealth and human capital rooted in early factor endowments,111 rather than 
primarily a consequence of their corporate laws. 
                      The “b” countries, with middling average company sizes, included most of Europe and 
North America. Also, South Africa and the Philippines - despite distinct enclave characteristics - had a 
sufficiently large private company sector to be classed with more developed economies.112 These 
economies, of course, had some very large companies: indeed the stock exchange data 
                                                          
108
 Its American twin, the quasi-colonial Panama Canal, was under construction for the US government, not for 
the capitalist sector. 
109
 Haber, Industry.  
110
 Haber, “Industrial Concentration,” Hanley, “Business finance.” However, this census suggests that Mexico 
had significantly more corporations per million people than Brazil (though the Latin American data sources are 
particularly weak and difficult to compare). 
111
 Sokoloff and Engerman, “Institutions.” 
112
 If the native population which did not participate in the modern sector were omitted from the 
denominator, South Africa would have approached the USA’s number of companies per capita in Table 3. 
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unsurprisingly confirm that their publicly-quoted companies (cols. 2 and 3) included most of the 
largest in the world. They also (col. 1) had many small, private companies, bringing the mean size 
down.  
                      The lower section (“c”) contains two disparate groups: small, mainly north-west 
European, nations (whose relatively liberal civil law, more corporation-friendly than that of larger 
continental countries, fostered exceptionally large numbers of companies per million people) and 
Asia-Pacific countries. The latter, like the enclave economies, had relatively few companies, but they 
had an impressive critical mass of smaller companies driving down their average size.  Some “c” 
economies (notably Switzerland, Singapore, New Zealand, Korea and Australia) were substantial 
hosts to inward multinational investment, but they also seem to have created a significant and 
vibrant local corporate SME sector, less visible in the enclave economies.   
                                                                                                V               
                              The data in this census have obvious implications for issues in the new institutional 
economics. We explore some of them econometrically in related work113 and anticipate that these 
new statistics will encourage others to do more. Traditional lists of the gains from incorporation - 
economies of scale, cheaper capital through liquidity and diversification effects, and so on - apply 
principally to publicly-quoted companies, where they drive growth through productivity gains and 
increased capital accumulation.114 By contrast, governments, economists and historians have 
sometimes seen the role of private companies as something of a sideshow, or even a misuse of the 
corporate form with negative economic consequences.115 Thousands of the large, quoted companies 
in Table 4 - railways, steel mills, multi-branch banks or electric power companies - had multi-million 
dollar capitals. However, in the decades after 1910, while some of these expanded, overall such 
companies declined in relative importance. As Rajan and Zingales have shown, wars, revolutions and 
market crashes restricted or closed stock exchanges and government bonds crowded out quoted 
                                                          
113
 References suppressed to preserve anonymity. 
114
 Rosenberg and Birdzell (How, pp. 189-241) provide a classic statement. 
115
 Johnson, Making. 
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equities.116 Scalable technologies like automobiles, electricity and telecoms depended more on 
family enterprises (Ford, Fiat, BMW, Siemens, Bosch, Michelin) and state undertakings (Volkswagen, 
Shanghai Automotive, electric power, telephone and road networks) than had railways, the 
enterprises that dominated nineteenth century stock exchanges. Giant companies also posed 
dangers: incumbent companies enjoying market power initially driven by scale economies resisted 
disruptive change by all means at their disposal, including political lobbying. Crony capitalist 
distortions led to business rent-seeking overwhelming the creation of new wealth, as in enclave 
economies, some state enterprises or in recent excesses by politically-favoured financial 
institutions.117 
                                Modern work on path-dependency and the deep historical roots of development 
reminds us of the difficulties of changing national trajectories. Yet nations do sometimes change and 
promoting liberal incorporation was one way that progress could be made in encouraging the 
competitive diversity that helps overcome developmental logjams. After 1910, the numbers of 
corporations massively increased worldwide, even (after a barren interval) in once-communist 
societies and faster in many civil law countries than in the Anglosphere. This trend is difficult to 
characterize as ill-advised. Limited liability in the private corporate form slowly transmuted into the 
main event, rather than a sideshow, and promoted disciplined pluralism through encouraging new 
entry, limiting the downside not only for investors (as in the commandite, once popular in civil law 
countries, but in decline)118 but also for entrepreneurs, so that they were more willing to innovate 
and take risks. If competitive assortment of a myriad of small corporations driving Schumpeterian 
creative destruction - multiple innovations and widespread bankruptcies - increased the rate of 
successful innovation, politicians were perhaps sensible to socialize at least some of the associated 
risks by allowing limited liability more widely and for managers as well as investors.  
                                                          
116
 Rajan and Zingales, “Great Reversals.” 
117
 Levenstein, “Escape,” p. 712. 
118
 Anon, “Statistique,” p.41; Viandier et al, Société, pp. 66-8, 85-8, 307-27. In commandite partnerships, 
general (entrepreneurial) partners had full liability, but sleeping partners (investors) had limited liability. 
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                           Desirable as it might be to quantify the benefits of this nebulous process, it is tricky 
with our corporate data. We cannot easily measure the additional investment induced by limited 
liability,119 its role in disciplining cronyism and monopoly120 and the benefits of risky experimentation 
that would have been shunned by only partly-limited or unlimited liability forms,121 against the social 
toll of creditors’ (and shareholders’) net losses from the unpaid debts of bankrupt limited 
companies. It is also clear from modern mutations like Russia (which arguably now has the finest 
corporate law in the world) that legal statutes alone are insufficient without the cultural and political 
underpinning that made them (sometimes) work elsewhere,122 while in post-reform China millions of 
new private businesses prosper, confident in political patronage, but with relatively weakly-defined 
systems of commercial law and property rights.123 
                       By the same token, though the world’s politicians increasingly appreciated the benefits 
of liberal incorporation that has become the World Bank’s ideal, we need to view corporate law 
mutations before 1914 not as simply trending towards one (or another) modern, legally-mandated, 
ideal model, but, critically, as promoting creative experimentation and hence most valuable for 
economies at the technological frontier, though contemporary economies and polities did not lack 
alternative/supplementary institutional mutations. Tardiness (relative to Anglo-Saxons) in embracing 
the corporate form plainly characterized France and Germany. They would possibly have benefitted 
from emulating Swiss, Norwegian or Dutch liberalism in (civil) corporate law for SMEs (Tables 3 and 
4), but mild tardiness may still not have egregiously damaged their business performance. By the 
same token, Americans - culturally hostile to financial concentration - perhaps did not suffer 
grievously from channeling corporate investment less than Europeans through their central stock 
exchange. Britons, despite “advantages” on both dimensions, no longer forged ahead, perhaps for 
entirely unrelated reasons, or because their financial precocity led them to venture beyond where 
                                                          
119
 Foreman-Peck, “1856.” 
120
 John et al, “Limited Liability.” 
121
 Grossman and Imai, “Contingent capital.” 
122
 Pistor et al, “Evolution.” 
123
 Bowen and Rose, “Absence.” 
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the (inverted U-shaped?) finance/growth nexus turned downwards. Germans had an apparently 
enormous deficit of limited liability, but they focused what they had (or well-managed, state-owned, 
substitutes) where they offered the clearest benefits: railways, banks, insurers, utilities and large-
scale manufacturing. Germany also had the world’s finest research universities and largest 
reinsurance industry, so was hardly devoid of alternative spurs to innovation and risk-sharing. 
Americans, too, had other means of financing innovative industries, with arguably superior 
monitoring to that provided by their modestly-sized, under-regulated NYSE.124 National business 
organization in 1910 showed considerable variation, but no major industrial country lacked some 
dynamic new industries, nor suffered excessively from sluggish SMEs. Liberal corporate 
organizational menus usefully encouraged experimentation, and some corporatization (or a state 
substitute) was a necessary condition for large-scale railway (and some other) developments, but 
recipes for success were diverse and corporations did not qualify as a sufficient condition for growth. 
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